In the first place, I propose to specify the debate between non-anthropocentrists and anthropocentrists as one between those who defend that the environment has intrinsic value, that is, value that while independent of all relation to human beings is still morally binding, and those who deny this, i.e., assert that the environment only has extrinsic value. I argue for the second option but claim that this should not be an obstacle to address some of the worries of environmental ethics, since (...) extrinsic value is not limited to instrumental value. In this regard, I present sentimentalism as an alternative according to which there are ways of valuing things as ends in themselves and not only as means. (shrink)

Despite the fact that their disagreement concerns the most basic metaethical and metaphysical questions regarding our relation to nature, it has become apparent that many anthropocentrists share with nonanthropocentrists a concern for the environment for its own sake, that is to say, a noninstrumental concern for nature. This concern is also present in practical spheres of environmental engagement. With regard to the philosophical task of justifying the claim that we ought to protect nature, this concern imposes on those that share (...) it at least three conditions: priority, independence of future interaction, and universality. Reasonably specified, these conditions are neutral between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism and should be attractive to both camps. Although there are reasons to think it would be difficult to meet all three conditions at the same time, with some modification a promising way to do it becomes apparent. (shrink)

Hernández Betancur, Juan Pablo. “Racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. El debate Dreyfus-McDowell.” Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía [Ciudad de México, UNAM], 47.140 (2015): 43-63.

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, (...) the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotionsquaembodied attitudes are evaluative. (shrink)

El debate reciente iniciado por Hubert Dreyfus y John McDowell ha llamado la atención sobre la relación entre racionalidad y acción no reflexiva. En este artículo propongo una forma de especificar el desacuerdo entre quienes llamaré intelectualistas y antiintelectualistas. A la luz de esta propuesta arguyo que el principal argumento antiintelectualista sólo tiene éxito si se acepta al menos uno de tres presupuestos implícitos que están lejos de ser autoevidentes y cuya verdad es puesta en duda por fenómenos familiares. Termino (...) con consideraciones que sugieren que el intelectualista ha quedado en una mejor posición argumentativa. (shrink)

In the first place, I propose to specify the debate between non-anthropocentrists and anthropocentrists as one between those who defend that the environment has intrinsic value, that is, value that while independent of all relation to human beings is still morally binding, and those who deny this, i.e., assert that the environment only has extrinsic value. I argue for the second option but claim that this should not be an obstacle to address some of the worries of environmental ethics, since (...) extrinsic value is not limited to instrumental value. In this regard, I present sentimentalism as an alternative according to which there are ways of valuing things as ends in themselves and not only as means. (shrink)

RESUMEN Con frecuencia el amor y la racionalidad se ven como capacidades que fácilmente entran en conflicto, cuando no se consideran por principio opuestas. En este artículo desarrollo algunos puntos esbozados por Harry Frankfurt con el fin de proponer que la relación entre amor y racionalidad no es de simple oposición. Tras ofrecer una caracterización del amor como disposición híbrida de seguimiento múltiple, defenderé que el amor es racional en el siguiente sentido: el amor no es justificable, pero a pesar (...) de ello es una fuente de razones básicas y a veces irresistibles que en buena medida informan el campo de nuestra racionalidad. Esto no significa que el amor sea una base irracional o arracional, o que sea completamente blindado a la razón, sino que en circunstancias específicas tiene sentido someter el amor a escrutinio racional. ABSTRACT Love and rationality are often considered as capacities which easily come into conflict, or are even opposed to one another. In the paper I elaborate some points suggested by Harry Frankfurt in order to propose that the relation between love and rationality is not one of opposition. After offering a characterization of love as a hybrid multi-track disposition, I will argue that love is rational in the following sense: although love is not justifiable, it is nevertheless a source of basic and sometimes irresistible reasons which to a large extent shape the field of our rationality. This does not mean that love is an irrational or arrational foundation, or that it is impervious to reason; it only means that in certain circumstances it makes sense to subject love to rational scrutiny. (shrink)

Genetic and early environmental factors are interwoven in the etiology of Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Epigenetic mechanisms offer the molecular machinery to adapt to environmental conditions. There are gaps in the knowledge about how epigenetic mechanisms are involved in the effects of early affective environment, development of BPD, and psychotherapy response. We reviewed the available evidence of the effects of psychotherapy on changes in DNA methylation and conducted a pilot study in a sample of 11 female adolescents diagnosed with BPD, (...) exploring for changes in peripheral DNA methylation of FKBP5 gene, which encodes for a stress response protein, in relation to psychotherapy, on symptomatology and underlying psychological processes. For this purpose, measures of early trauma, borderline and depressive symptoms, psychotherapy outcome, mentalization, and emotional regulation were studied. A reduction in the average FKBP5 methylation levels was observed over time. Additionally, the decrease in FKBP5 methylation observed occurred only in those individuals who had early trauma and responded to psychotherapy. The results suggest an effect of psychotherapy on epigenetic mechanisms associated with the stress response. The finding that epigenetic changes were only observed in patients with early trauma suggests a specific molecular mechanism of recovery. The results should be taken with caution given the small sample size. Also, further research is needed to adjust for confounding factors and include endocrinological markers and therapeutic process variables. (shrink)

The objective of this research is to identify the main weaknesses of corporate social responsibility in the textile sector and to propose procedures that help to overcome them. We start from the assumption that the asymmetries and necessary relationships generated to manufacture textile garments in the international context are not attributable to a single circumstance. Equally, it is reasonable to assume that the solutions to these asymmetries are affected by the identification and transversality of such circumstances. The present research was (...) carried out by gathering the opinions and solutions of participants in a Delphi analysis to uncover the critical points and vulnerabilities of the sector. The weaknesses of the sector were then identified following the analysis of responses from two expert panels to two multidisciplinary questionnaires, the questions for which were developed from the stated hypotheses.El objetivo de esta investigación es detectar las principales debilidades del sector textil en relación con la responsabilidad social empresarial y proponer medidas que contribuyan a superarlas. Partimos de que las asimetrías y relaciones generadas necesarias para fabricar prendas textiles en el contexto internacional no son imputables a una sola circunstancia. Es igualmente entendible que sus soluciones pasen por la identificación y la transversalidad de dichas circunstancias. En la presente investigación, lo llevamos a cabo mediante la de la recolección de opiniones y soluciones expresadas por diferentes participantes, y a través de un análisis Delphi, para conocer cuáles son los puntos críticos y vulnerabilidades del sector, y la posterior identificación de sus debilidades tras el análisis de las respuestas de dos paneles de expertos a dos cuestionarios multidisciplinares con preguntas desarrolladas sobre las hipótesis planteadas. (shrink)

Does self-control require willpower? The question cuts to the heart of a debate about whether self-control is identical with some psychological process internal to the agents or not. Noticeably absent from these debates is systematic evidence about the folk-psychological category of self-control. Here, we present the results of two behavioral studies (N = 296) that indicate the structure of everyday use of the concept. In Study 1, participants rated the degree to which different strategies to respond to motivational conflict exemplify (...) self-control. Participants distinguished between intra-psychic and externally-scaffolded strategies and judged that the former exemplified self-control more than the latter. In Study 2, participants provided various solutions to manage motivational conflict and rated their proposals on effectiveness. Participants produced substantially more intra-psychic strategies, rated them as more effective, and advised them at a higher rate than externally-scaffolded strategies. Taken together, these results suggest that while people recognize a plurality of strategies as genuine instances of self-control, purely internal exercises of self-control are considered more prototypical than their externally-scaffolded counterparts. This implies a hierarchical structure for the folk psychological category of self-control. The concept encompasses a variety of regulatory strategies and organizes these strategies along a hierarchical continuum, with purely intra-psychic strategies at the center and scaffolded strategies in the periphery. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

El siguiente texto contiene una presentación resumida de la investigación doctoral del autor. Tomando como ejemplo la producción de las artes visuales centroamericanas del período inmediatamente posterior a la firma de los acuerdos de paz en la región se analizan las relaciones entre imagen y palabra en las obras del arte visual en que se experimenta con diversas dimensiones de la palabra escrita. Para realizar ese análisis ha sido necesario construir un aparato conceptual y un esquema de análisis que vincule (...) dicho recurso artístico con la producción social de espacios, sujeciones y miradas a través de las convenciones mediales ejercidas en las culturas gráficas y visuales, y en sus formas y posibilidades de relación. (shrink)

Effort and the feeling of effort play important roles in many theoretical discussions, from perception to self-control and free will, from the nature of ownership to the nature of desert and achievement. A crucial, overlooked distinction within the philosophical and scientific literatures is the distinction between theories that seek to explain effort and theories that seek to explain the feeling of effort. Lacking a clear distinction between these two phenomena makes the literature hard to navigate. To advance in the unification (...) and development of this area, this article provides an overview of the main theories of the nature of effort and the nature of the feeling of effort, and then discusses how efforts and their feelings are related. Two key takeaways emerge. First, there is widespread agreement that efforts are goal-directed actions. Second, one of the main philosophical issues to be decided is whether feelings of effort should be defined by reference to efforts (effort-first approach), or whether efforts are defined by reference to the feeling of effort (feeling-first approach). (shrink)

By elaborating on the results presented in Lógica cuántica, Nmatrices y adecuación I, here we discuss the notions of adequacy and truth functionality in quantum logic from the point of view of a non-deterministic semantics based on Nmatrices. We present a proof of the impossibility of providing a functional semantics for the quantum lattice. An advantage of our proof is that it is independent of the number of truth values involved, generalizing previous works. Due to the impossibility of defining adequate (...) interpreting sets for the conjunction and disjunction (as was shown in our previous work), it follows that a homomorphism between the lattice of quantum projections and a Boolean algebra of n-elements cannot exist. (shrink)

In this work, we discuss the failure of the principle of truth functionality in the quantum formalism. By exploiting this failure, we import the formalism of N-matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics to the foundations of quantum mechanics. This is done by describing quantum states as particular valuations associated with infinite non-deterministic truth tables. This allows us to introduce a natural interpretation of quantum states in terms of a non-deterministic semantics. We also provide a similar construction for arbitrary probabilistic theories based (...) in orthomodular lattices, allowing to study post-quantum models using logical techniques. (shrink)

A general mathematical framework, based on countable partitions of Natural Numbers [1], is presented, that allows to provide a Semantics to propositional languages. It has the particularity of allowing both the valuations and the interpretation Sets for the connectives to discriminate complexity of the formulas. This allows different adequacy criteria to be used to assess formulas associated with the same connective, but that differ in their complexity. The presented method can be adapted potentially infinite number of connectives and truth values, (...) therefore, it can be considered a general framework to provide semantics to several of the known logic systems (eg, LC, L3 LP, FDE). The presented semantics allow to converge to different standard semantics if the separation complexity procedure is annulled. Therefore, it can be understood as a framework that allows greater precision (in complexity terms) with respect to formula satisfaction. Naturally, because of how it is built, it can be incorporated into non-deterministic semantics. The presented procedure also allows generating valuations that grant a different truth value to each formula of propositional language. As a positive side effect, our method allows a constructive proof of the equipotence between N and N^n for all Natural n. (shrink)

Habitual action would still be a tremendously pervasive feature of our agency. And yet, references to habitual action have been marginal at best in contemporary philosophy of action. This neglect is due, at least, to the combination of two ideas. The first is a widespread view of habit as entirely automatic, inflexible, and irresponsive to reasons. The second is philosophy of action’s tendency (dominant at least since Anscombe and Davidson) to focus on explaining action by reference to reasons. Arguably, if (...) habitual behavior is reasons-irresponsive, and if action is explained by reference to reasons, the study of habit would have very little to teach about action. Recently, however, there has been a surge in philosophical interest on habit and habitual action. Novel approaches are challenging the two ideas mentioned above, arguing that (1) habitual behavior is not entirely automatic or inflexible, but instead has a particular kind of flexibility and intentionality; and that (2) acting out of habit can count as a form of acting for reasons, even in the absence of the traditional rationalizing mental states: belief, desire, and intention. -/- The essays contained in this issue move discussions forward in exciting new directions. In what follows we present each paper and situate it within its broader theoretical context, so that this introduction may serve also as an introduction to the topic of habitual action. A crucial lesson that emerges from these essays is a need to move past disputes between philosophical schools or traditions. Rather than combatting between different philosophical factions, an ecumenical approach capable of skillfully bringing together elements from different traditions seems better able to tackle problems that remain unsolved. These problems include (but are not limited to): developing an account of responsibility for habitual action; explaining our ability to perform joint habitual actions; and clarifying the link between habit and self-control. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo, analizamos el cuento El Inmortal de Borges prestándole principal atención a las situaciones donde se entrelazan, o se tratan sin diferenciar demasiado, cuestiones vinculadas con la animalidad y la divinidad. Sostenemos que esta especie de confusión o falta de precisión al tratar cuestiones que se alejan tanto de la identidad personal y del Yo, como la inmortalidad, no es un elemento casual ni sin fundamento, sino que puede ser analizado filosóficamente adentrándonos la otredad animal. El Inmortal (...) nos manifiesta que la filosofía podría no haber sido lo suficientemente precisa al tratar la otredad, permitiendo que animalidad y divinidad, o más bien ciertas propiedades características de cada una, puedan amalgamarse dentro de los lindes de este concepto. Que el cuento de Borges haga convivir de forma tan característica la inacción con la inmortalidad hace de esta obra un objeto de reflexión obligatorio para todos los interesados en el concepto de otredad. (shrink)

The literature on mathematical explanation contains numerous examples of explanatory, and not so explanatory proofs. In this paper we report results of an empirical study aimed at investigating mathematicians’ notion of explanatoriness, and its relationship to accounts of mathematical explanation. Using a Comparative Judgement approach, we asked 38 mathematicians to assess the explanatory value of several proofs of the same proposition. We found an extremely high level of agreement among mathematicians, and some inconsistencies between their assessments and claims in the (...) literature regarding the explanatoriness of certain types of proofs. (shrink)

Self-control, the capacity to resist temptations and pursue longer-term goals over immediate gratifications, is crucial in determining the overall shape of our lives, and thereby in our ability to shape our identities. As it turns out, this capacity is intimately linked with our ability to control the direction of our attention. This raises the worry that perhaps social media are making us more easily distracted people, and therefore less able to exercise self-control. Is this so? And is it necessarily a (...) bad thing? This paper analyzes the nature of attention, its vices and virtues, and what currently available evidence has to say about the effects of social media on attention and self-control. The pattern that seems to be emerging is that, although there is an association between higher use of social media and lower attentional control, we do not yet know whether it is social media use that makes people more distracted, or whether those who use social media the most do so because they are more easily distracted. Either way, the rise of the ‘Web 2.0’ does raise questions about whether the virtues of attention will change in the future, and whether this will bring with it a transformation in the way we shape our selves. (shrink)

Self-control is the ability to inhibit temptations and persist in one’s decisions about what to do. In this article, we review recent evidence that suggests implicit beliefs about the process of self-control influence how the process operates. While earlier work focused on the moderating influence of willpower beliefs on depletion effects, we survey new directions in the field that emphasize how beliefs about the nature of self-control, self-control strategies, and their effectiveness have effects on downstream regulation and judgment. These new (...) directions highlight the need to better understand the role of self-control beliefs in naturalistic decision-making. (shrink)

Self-control is deemed crucial for reasons-responsive agency and a key contributor to long-term wellbeing. But recent studies suggest that effortfully resisting one’s temptations does not contribute to long-term goal attainment, and can even be harmful. So how does self-control improve our lives? Finding an answer requires revising the role that overcoming temptation plays in self-control. This paper distinguishes two forms of self-control problems: temptation (the presence of a strong wayward motivation) and apathy (the lack of commitment-advancing motivation). This distinction makes (...) it possible to separate negative self-control (aimed at overcoming temptation) from positive self-control (aimed at overcoming lack of motivation). The paper argues that temptation should not play a central role in our conception of self-control, since overcoming temptation is neither necessary nor sufficient for successful self-control. (shrink)

A central aim of cognitive science is to understand the fundamental mechanisms that enable humans to navigate and make sense of complex environments. In this letter, we argue that computational complexity theory, a foundational framework for evaluating computational resource requirements, holds significant potential in addressing this challenge. As humans possess limited cognitive resources for processing vast amounts of information, understanding how humans perform complex cognitive tasks requires comprehending the underlying factors that drive information processing demands. Computational complexity theory provides a (...) comprehensive theoretical framework to achieve this goal. By adopting this framework, we can gain new insights into how cognitive systems work and develop a more nuanced understanding of the relation between task complexity and human behavior. We provide empirical evidence supporting our argument and identify several open research questions and challenges in applying computational complexity theory to human decision‐making and cognitive science at large. (shrink)

In “Willpower with and without effort”, G. Ainslie advances our understanding of selfcontrol by theoretically unifying multiple forms of willpower. But one crucial question remains unanswered: How do agents pick the right forms of willpower in each situation? I argue that willpower requires tactical skill, which detects willpower-demanding contexts, selects context-appropriate tactics, and monitors their implementation. Research on tactical skill will significantly advance our understanding of willpower.

Some partitions of Natural Number set are built through recursive processesgenerating in this manner countable examples of countable and disjoint sets whose unionis a set also countable. This process is constructive, so the Axiom of choice is not used.We provide a PC program that generates one of these special partitions and shows howto generate infinite of them. This line of reasoning can have multiple applications in Settheory and Model theory. We proved that the number of ways to make these partitionsof (...) natural numbers is not countable, there are more of these partitions (named doublycountable) than natural numbers. For each natural number greater than 1, we show aneffective procedure that generates these partitions -/- . (shrink)

Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of (...) speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness. (shrink)

Social systems are always exposed to critical processes in which their organization, or part of it, is questioned by the society that demands solutions through different critical saliences. The traditional approach to such social crises has mainly focused on their anticipation and management, implying that the focus is on trying to deal with crises once they occur, rather than delving in their essential characteristics that seemingly depend on the adaptive nature of the system and the increase in its internal complexity. (...) To address this issue, we propose a dual approach that utilizes both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to delve into the relationship between the complexity of the social system, its adaptation, and critical episodes. Our analysis shows how an explosive economic growth affects a social system, increasing its complexity. This complexity produces different demands from the system itself. These demands manifest signatures of complexity such as a heterogeneous and rich social structure, which emerges during moments when the society acts strongly. (shrink)

Concerns about threats to human autonomy feature prominently in the field of AI ethics. One aspect of this concern relates to the use of AI systems for problematically manipulative influence. In response to this, the European Union’s draft AI Act (AIA) includes a prohibition on AI systems deploying subliminal techniques that alter people’s behavior in ways that are reasonably likely to cause harm (Article 5(1)(a)). Critics have argued that the term ‘subliminal techniques’ is too narrow to capture the target cases (...) of AI-based manipulation. We propose a definition of ‘subliminal techniques’ that (a) is grounded on a plausible interpretation of the legal text; (b) addresses all or most of the underlying ethical concerns motivating the prohibition; (c) is defensible from a scientific and philosophical perspective; and (d) does not over-reach in ways that impose excessive administrative and regulatory burdens. The definition is meant to provide guidance for design teams seeking to pursue responsible and ethically aligned AI innovation. (shrink)

Interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of action in the last few decades has tended toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by the revival of anti-intellectualism (particularly from J. Moss’ work), according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. In this essay I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and propose an intermediate account, which (...) I call indirect intellectualism, that preserves the merits of both traditional interpretations and is able to dispel the problems that trouble each. There is very strong textual evidence for the claim that goal-setting is the task not of reason but of character (and in this anti-intellectualists are right); but reason is able to set goals indirectly by carefully shaping the processes of habituation that constitute a person’s character (and in this intellectualists are right). I argue for this position through a study of the division of labour between character and reason, and through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s conception of habituation. (shrink)

This article seeks to raise the problems of the notion of difference according to Heidegger and Deleuze, for, to our knowledge, they are two of the mayor contemporary thinkers who have influenced our time by addressing this issue. What is “new” about the ways Heidegger and Deleuze think the notion of difference? What convergences appear between their proposals? What disagreements occur between their philosophies? The article is an attempt to provide critical answers to these questions.

For agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling view, which states that (...) the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort. (shrink)

Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...) intellectualism is that Aristotle explicitly states reason cannot set the goals of action. The key problem for anti-intellectualism is that he also holds that the soul’s rational part must guide and prescribe over the non-rational part. I propose indirect intellectualism, a promising middle path. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the notions of adequacy and truth functionality in quantum logic from the point of view of a non-deterministic semantics. We give a characterization of the degree of non-functionality which is compatible with the propositional structure of quantum theory, showing that having truth-functional connectives, together with some assumptions regarding the relation of logical consequence, commits us to the adequacy of the interpretation sets of these connectives. An advantage of our proof is that it is independent of (...) the number of truth values involved, generalizing previous works. We also show the failure of the adequacy of every Nmatrix that is a model of the non-distributive lattice of quantum propositions. En este trabajo discutimos las nociones de adecuación y veritativo-funcionalidad en la lógica cuántica, desde el punto de vista de una semántica no determinista. Damos una caracterización del grado de no-funcionalidad compatible con la estructura proposicional de la teoría cuántica, mostrando que tener conectivos veritativo-funcionales, junto con algunos presupuestos relativos a la relación de consecuencia lógica, nos compromete con la adecuación de los conjuntos de interpretación de estos conectivos. Un punto ventajoso de nuestra prueba es que se independiza de la cantidad de valores de verdad involucrados, generalizando trabajos previos. Probamos también que falla la adecuación de cualquier Nmatriz que sirva como modelo para el retículo no distributivo de proposiciones cuánticas. (shrink)

This paper introduces the theory QST of quasets as a formal basis for the Nmatrices. The main aim is to construct a system of Nmatrices by substituting standard sets by quasets. Since QST is a conservative extension of ZFA (the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Atoms), it is possible to obtain generalized Nmatrices (Q-Nmatrices). Since the original formulation of QST is not completely adequate for the developments we advance here, some possible amendments to the theory are also considered. One of the (...) most interesting traits of such an extension is the existence of complementary quasets which admit elements with undetermined membership. Such elements can be interpreted as quantum systems in superposed states. We also present a relationship of QST with the theory of Rough Sets RST, which grants the existence of models for QST formed by rough sets. Some consequences of the given formalism for the relation of logical consequence are also analysed. (shrink)

El presente artículo realiza una revisión de uno los procesos administrativos más invisibles para la población del Ecuador y para el sector de la salud, que es la auditoría de recuperación de costos de las atenciones médicas, que se da luego de las atenciones de salud mediante cobertura de seguros públicos, ya sea en unidades de salud públicas o privadas bajo cobertura pública. Para ahondar el en proceso descrito es necesario conocer el sistema de salud ecuatoriano, realizar comparativas con otros (...) países y analizar las leyes, normativas y reglamentos establecidos para el pago económico y que permiten la continua gestión entre lo público y lo privado en el sector de la salud, se analiza además los resultados de una conducta omisiva del personal que realiza la auditoría de cuentas médicas y que puede provocar problemas enormes tanto al sector público como financiador y al privado como prestador de salud, que al final lo que deriva en una responsabilidad administrativa. (shrink)

En el dominio del cuidado y la tecnología se realizan principalmente investigaciones sobre la aplicación de la tecnología al cuidado en campos o afectados específicos. En este artículo se aborda una perspectiva diferente analizando algunos efectos colaterales de las tecnologías digitales que debilitan elementos considerados sistémicos a nivel individual y social como: la privacidad y la autonomía personal; la función social de los medios de comunicación; la dinámica social deliberativa; la necesidad de orientar la regulación de las tecnologías digitales al (...) impacto personal y social; la capacidad de atención y reflexión de las personas. Se propone el nuevo ámbito del cuidado de los cimientos sistémicos individuales y sociales ante el impacto de las tecnologías digitales con objeto de preservar su esencia humanizadora y la sostenibilidad de la sociedad abierta democrática que conocemos. (shrink)

Fenómenos contemporáneos en torno a la visibilización de los autores y sus obras, y relacionados con las responsabilidades de los diversos agentes en el campo literario, ponen sobre la mesa una y otra vez preguntas a propósito de los mecanismos y las expectativas del ejercicio de lectura crítica por parte de los lectores. El presente artículo se propone explicitar los rendimientos descriptivos y normativos que para dicho ejercicio ofrece el concepto de resonancia, propuesto por Hartmut Rosa en el seno de (...) su sociología crítica de la vida buena. La pregunta rectora reza: ¿de qué manera la idea de un vínculo resonante con la obra enriquece la comprensión y modelización de la lectura crítica? Para responder a ello, el artículo expone en primer lugar el concepto de resonancia; a continuación, ilustra tres formas de relación con la obra mediante analogías con los casos retratados en el documental Grizzly Man de Werner Herzog, en la novela Rayuela de Julio Cortázar y en el cuento “Ficción” de Alice Munro. Finalmente, a modo de respuesta, se plantea la tesis de que la teoría de la resonancia permite conceptualizar la agencia (deseable) del lector en términos de una mediopasividad o medioactividad que involucra tanto la exposición a diferentes instancias de mediación como la materialización de un juicio crítico-ético sobre la obra, en la estela de Wayne C. Booth. (shrink)

Este artículo indaga sobre el fundamento subjetivo de la percepción del tiempo. El abordaje propuesto recorre la idea husserliana del tiempo como experiencia íntima y flujo permanente. En el camino se aventuran especulaciones sobre la tradición filosófica inclinada a establecer vínculos indisolubles entre la conciencia, el conocimiento del tiempo y la imaginación. El hilo conductor es la correlación existente en la experiencia humana del tiempo a partir de la sucesión mental de esa triada compuesta por el pasado, presente y futuro. (...) Si la identidad humana se compone de procesos de memoria y la anticipación del futuro, entonces cabría preguntarse hasta qué punto las impresiones subjetivas del flujo temporal son fundamento básico de la autopercepción, el yo y cualquier mirada introspectiva. También se incluyen consideraciones sobre los efectos de la temporalidad en la consciencia y la construcción del yo. (shrink)

El escrito a continuación muestra un problema de la investigación científico-jurídica respecto de los métodos, metodologías y epistemologías. Para esto, me propongo analizar las epistemologías feministas, en contraste con la epistemología jurídica hegemónica. En un primer momento, describo el desarrollo de las epistemologías y metodologías de la modernidad, específicamente el positivismo tradicional, y el cambio al positivismo lógico. En un segundo momento, señalo la denuncia que los estudios de género han realizado a las epistemologías hegemónicas. Después, refiero las contrapropuestas epistemológicas (...) y metodológicas que el feminismo hace a partir de 1970 aproximadamente. En un cuarto momento, indico el estado conceptual del positivismo jurídico; y finiquito con problematizar el positivismo jurídico desde las contrapropuestas epistémicas y metodológicas del feminismo. (shrink)

Voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) have gained popularity in recent times as stakeholders strengthen pressure on private firms to address the climate crisis. In this article, I analyze a type of VEP with increasing importance within the private sector: environmental coalitions. Focusing on US publicly traded firms, I show that the firms that join a green coalition are greener than others and that they were also greener before becoming members. I apply a difference-in-differences design, using the fact that different firms became (...) members at different points in time, and find no effect of membership on different measures of environmental performance. Why, then, do firms incur the costs of creating and maintaining these coalitions? I show that shareholder pressure, in particular from liberal and active individual shareholders, can explain this behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that membership in a green coalition can be a tool for firms to signal their environmental credentials when faced with pressure from pro-environmental stakeholders. (shrink)